

Message Text

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AMEMBASSY VIENNA
AMEMBASSY WARSAW
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E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: NATO CSCE PARM
SUBJ: CSCE/CBMS: FEBRUARY 10 DISCUSSION

REF: STATE 030016 (DTG 100037Z FEB 77)(NOTAL)

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BEGIN SUMMARY: AT FEBRUARY 10 MEETING ON CBMS, POLADS AGREED TO
BEGIN DRAFTING PAPER OUTLINING ALLIED STRATEGY ON CBMS AT
BELGRADE; PAPER, WHICH NATO INTERNATIONAL STAFF (IS) HOPES
CAN BE APPROVED BY MID-APRIL, MIGHT BE INCORPORATED
INTO OVERALL REPORT ON CSCE PREPARATIONS FOR BELGRADE.
IN ADDITION, WE SENSE THAT--DESPITE CONTINUED DESIRE
OF SOME SMALLER ALLIES TO SEEK EXPANDED CBMS AT BELGRADE--
MOST ALLIES ARE PREPARED TO ACCEPT A BELGRADE OUTCOME
IN WHICH THERE WOULD BE ONLY MINOR, IF ANY, EXPANSION
OF CBMS. IN PARTICULAR, THERE APPEARS TO BE INCREASING

CAUTION AMONG SOME ALLIES ABOUT ADVISABILITY OF SEEKING A MOVEMENTS CBM WHICH MIGHT, IN TIMES OF CRISIS, HAMPER ALLIED FLEXIBILITY. POLADS WILL HOLD FURTHER CBMS MEETINGS ON MARCH 3 AND MARCH 17. ACTION REQUEST: WE BELIEVE THAT EARLY CONTRIBUTION OF US ANALYSES ON SPECIFIC CBM PROPOSALS WOULD BE WELCOMED BY ALLIES AND AND WOULD OFFER OPPORTUNITY TO INFLUENCE DRAFTING OF IS PAPER. WE REQUEST GUIDANCE IN TIME FOR MARCH 3 CBMS MEETING. END SUMMARY.

1. GENERAL. IN OPENING THE MEETING, CHAIRMAN (PABSCH) NOTED THAT, SINCE THE MAY NAC MINISTERIAL MEETING WAS ONLY THREE MONTHS AWAY, IT WAS NECESSARY TO STEP UP ALLIED PLANNING FOR THE CBMS ASPECTS OF THE BELGRADE MEETING. HE PROPOSED THAT POLADS BEGIN DRAFTING AT AN EARLY DATE OF A CBMS PAPER WHICH COULD BE INCORPORATED INTO OVERALL REPORT TO MINISTERS ON BELGRADE PREPARATIONS. PABSCH HOPED SUCH A CBMS PAPER COULD BE READY BY MID-APRIL, SO THAT EC-NINE FOREIGN MINISTERS COULD TAKE IT INTO ACCOUNT WHEN THEY MET APRIL 18-19. POLADS SUPPORTED CHAIRMAN'S SUGGESTION THAT IS BEGIN DRAFTING SUCH A PAPER. UK AND FRENCH REPS COMMENTED THAT PAPER SHOULD ADDRESS QUESTION OF ALLIED TACTICS AT BELGRADE. IN EXPRESSING OUR APPROVAL OF PREPARATION OF PAPER, WE OUTLINED US VIEWS IN PARAS 1-7 OF
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REF A, STRESSING OUR OPPOSITION TO CREATION OF POST-BELGRADE EXPERTS GROUP ON MILITARY SUBJECTS. WE ALSO CARRIED OUT INSTRUCTIONS IN STATE 029625 (NOTAL AND PROPOSED US CHANGE IN LIST OF POINTS FOR BELGRADE WAS ACCEPTED.

2. POSSIBLE WESTERN PROPOSALS. IN DISCUSSION OF A POSSIBLE LOWERING OF THE NOTIFICATION THRESHOLD FOR MANEUVERS, WE DREW ON PARA 8 OF REF A TO SUGGEST POSSIBLE APPROACHES. ENSUING DISCUSSION SHOWED THAT, WHILE MOST ALLIES AGREE ON AT LEAST THE TACTICAL UTILITY OF PROPOSING A LOWERED THRESHOLD--AND OF SEEKING MORE NOTIFICATIONS OF SMALLER MANEUVERS--FEW GOVERNMENTS APPEAR TO HAVE WELL-THOUGHT-OUT VIEW ON HOW THESE PROPOSALS MIGHT BE PRESENTED AT BELGRADE. FRG REP SAID THAT, THOUGH HIS AUTHORITIES WOULD LIKE TO DEVELOP THE CBMS PROVISIONS OF THE FINAL ACT, BONN CAN LIVE WITH THE EXISTING PROVISIONS AND DOES "NOT INTEND TO PAY A PRICE FOR AN IMPROVEMENT." MOREOVER, THE FRG BELIEVES, SHOULD IT PROVE IMPOSSIBLE TO ACHIEVE IMPROVEMENT, THE BELGRADE CONFERENCE RECORD WOULD SHOW WHO IS RESPONSIBLE FOR LACK OF PROGRESS, AND THE WEST SHOULD CONTINUE TO INSIST ON FULL IMPLEMENTATION OF THE EXISTING PROVISIONS. WESTERN PROPOSALS, IN THE FRG VIEW, CAN "DEVELOP ORGANICALLY" OUT OF THE DISCUSSIONS AT BELGRADE AND NEED NOT RESULT IN CHANGING THE TEXT OF THE FINAL ACT.

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AMEMBASSY WARSAW

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3. FRENCH REP EXPRESSED HER AUTHORITIES' OPPOSITION

TO SEEKING IMPROVED CBMS THROUGH CHANGES IN THE FINAL

ACT, BUT DID NOT SPECIFICALLY EXCLUDE POSSIBILITY OF THE

WEST PUTTING FORWARD CBMS PROPOSALS FOR TACTICAL PURPOSES.

BELGIAN REP SAID HIS AUTHORITIES WERE FLEXIBLE ON THIS

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SUBJECT, A VIEW ECHOED BY ITALIAN POLAD. NORWEGIAN REP

SAID HE SENSED THAT ALLIES WERE SOFTENING THEIR FIRM

PRE-HELSINKI COMMON POSITION IN FAVOR OF AN ACTIVE CBMS POLICY;

IN HIS VIEW, WHILE WESTERN CBMS PROPOSALS AT BELGRADE

WOULD INDEED HAVE TACTICAL UTILITY, THE WEST SHOULD ALSO TRY TO

ACHIEVE REAL IMPROVEMENTS. SUCH IMPROVEMENTS WOULD BE

IMPORTANT TO NORWAY, WITH ITS EXPOSED GEOGRAPHIC POSITION.

NORWEGIAN VIEW WAS SUPPORTED BY GREEK DELEGATION,

WHICH CIRCULATED PAPER (REPORTED BY AIRGRAM) PROPOSING THAT ALLIES: (A) SEEK COMPULSORY NOTIFICATION OF MANEUVERS ABOVE A 10,000 TROOP THRESHOLD; (B) NOTIFY MOVEMENTS OF TROOPS INVOLVED IN A NOTIFIED MANEUVER, AS WELL AS ALL MILITARY MOVEMENTS INVOLVING MORE THAN 10,000 TROOPS; (C) NOTIFY NAVAL AND AIR MANEUVERS; (D) NOTIFY 30 DAYS PRIOR TO MANEUVER, AND MENTION THE MANEUVER'S CLOSING DATE IN THE NOTIFICATION; (E) SEEK AN END TO THE EXCEPTIONS IN THE TERRITORIAL APPLICABILITY OF CBMS.

4. ON THE QUESTION OF WHETHER TO STRESS THE NOTIFICATION OF SMALLER MANEUVERS IN BORDER AREAS, UK REP SAID HIS AUTHORITIES AGREE WITH US VIEW OF THE INADVISABILITY OF SUCH AN APPROACH, WHICH WOULD BUTTRESS THE SOVIETS' GEOGRAPHICALLY RESTRICTIVE VIEW OF CBMS. NORWEGIAN REP ADMITTED THAT THIS CONCEPT MIGHT BE UNREALISTIC AND INVITED ALLIED SUGGESTIONS ON HOW THE CONCERNS OF GEOGRAPHICALLY EXPOSED COUNTRIES MIGHT BE MET.

5. AS REGARDS IMPROVED TREATMENT OF CBM OBSERVERS, BELGIAN REP SAID THAT THE ALLIES SHOULD NOT GO TOO FAR IN PROPOSING BETTER CONDITIONS LEST THEY CREATE THE IMPRESSION THEY WERE SEEKING TO USE OBSERVERS FOR INTELLIGENCE PURPOSES.

6. IN SUMMARIZING DISCUSSION OF POSSIBLE WESTERN PROPOSALS, CHAIRMAN SAID THAT THE MAJORITY VIEW APPEARED TO BE THAT MAJOR CBMS IMPROVEMENTS AT BELGRADE APPEARED UNLIKELY, AND CONFIDENTIAL

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THAT THE ALLIES SHOULD GIVE PRIORITY TO THE TACTICAL USEFULNESS OF PUTTING FORWARD CBMS PROPOSALS. HE URGED POLADS TO TRY TO REACH AGREEMENT ON MODALITIES FOR PUTTING FORWARD SUCH PROPOSALS.

7. MOVEMENTS. IN DISCUSSION OF A POSSIBLE ALLIED PROPOSAL OF A MOVEMENTS CBM, INTERNATIONAL MILITARY STAFF (IMS) REP (GROUP CAPTAIN SMITH) SUMMARIZED STAFF-LEVEL VIEWS OF NATO MILITARY AUTHORITIES AS FOLLOWS: (A) REQUIREMENT TO NOTIFY NAVAL OR AIR MOVEMENTS IN ADVANCE WOULD BE A SERIOUS INHIBITION ON ALLIED FLEXIBILITY IN PEACETIME; (B) ALTHOUGH ROUTINE MAJOR MILITARY GROUND MOVEMENTS WOULD BE NOTIFIED IN ADVANCE WITHOUT ADVERSE MILITARY EFFECTS, IT WOULD BE DIFFICULT OR IMPOSSIBLE TO DEVISE A FORMULA WHICH DID NOT AT THE SAME TIME INHIBIT FREEDOM TO DEPLOY GROUND FORCES IN TIMES OF TENSION OR CRISIS; (C) ONLY MOVEMENTS STRICTLY LINKED WITH THE EXECUTION OF A MAJOR GROUND (I.E., NOTIFIABLE) MANEUVER SHOULD BE CONSIDERED FOR NOTIFICATION. IMS REP SAID THAT FINAL APPROVAL BY THE MILITARY COMMITTEE OF THE IMS PAPER ON CBMS, WHICH INCLUDES THIS POSITION ON MOVEMENTS, WAS SCHEDULED FOR MID-MARCH.

8. BELGIAN REP SAID THAT HE WAS IMPRESSED BY THEIMS
ARGUMENTS FOR PRESERVING ALLIED OPERATIONAL FLEXIBILITY IN
TIMES OF TENSION OR CRISIS. THUS, HE CONTINUED, WHILE
HIS AUTHORITIES DO NOT OPPOSE A MOVEMENTS CBM, THE VIEWS
OF THE ALLIANCE'S MILITARY AUTHORITIES SHOULD BE TAKEN
INTO ACCOUNT. TURKISH REP COMMENTED THAT HIS AUTHORITIES
COULD ACCEPT AN INITIATIVE AIMED AT ACHIEVING A MOVEMENTS
CBM, BUT ONLY IF ALL ALLIES AGREED THAT SUCH AN INITI-
ATIVE WAS DESIRABLE.

9. POSSIBLE NEUTRAL AND NON-ALIGNED PROPOSALS. IN
INCONCLUSIVE DISCUSSION, GENERAL VIEW WAS THAT THE
WEST AS YET DOES NOT HAVE A CLEAR IDEA OF WHICH PROPOSALS
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NEUTRALS AND NON-ALIGNED WILL ADVANCE (A CONCLUSION
SUPPORTED BY VIENNA'S 1073 (NOTAL), WHICH WE RECEIVED
AFTER POLADS MEETING). IN COURSE OF DISCUSSION, WE NOTED
THAT POSSIBLE AUSTRIAN PROPOSALS LISTED IN USNATO 505 APPARENTLY
REPRESENTED PRELIMINARY THINKING IN VIENNA RATHER THAN
FIRM PROPOSALS (VIENNA1049).

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10. WARSAW PACT COUNTRIES. CHAIRMAN SUGGESTED THAT THE ALLIES MIGHT WISH TO CONSIDER PREPARING A LIST OF COMMON THEMES WHICH THEY COULD USE IN DISCUSSING WP IMPLEMENTATION AT BELGRADE. THERE WAS GENERAL AGREEMENT THAT WP COUNTRIES, WITH THE POSSIBLE EXCEPTION OF ROMANIA, WERE CONFIDENTIAL

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UNLIKELY TO PUT FORWARD PROPOSALS FOR EXPANDING PRESENT CBMS PROVISIONS.

11. FRG ANALYSIS OF NATO AND WARSAW PACT MANEUVERS. FRG REP CIRCULATED FOLLOWING ANALYSIS:

BEGIN TEXT:

A. COMBAT EXERCISES OF NATO GROUND FORCES IN THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY AND OF WP GROUND FORCES IN THE GDR, CSSR AND POLAND:

NATO (IN THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY)

UP TO 10,000 MEN 10,000 TO 25,000 OVER 25,000 TOTAL

1973	32	4	4	40
1974	30	11	3	44
1975	39	6	2	47
1976	39	1	3	43
TOTAL:	140	22	12	174

WP (IN THE GDR, CSSR, POLAND)

1973	12	15	-	27
1974	21	8	2	31
1975	20	14	-	34
1976	34	18	1	53
TOTAL:	87	55	3	145

B. THE TOTAL EXERCISE ACTIVITY OF NATO AND WP GROUND FORCES IN THE AREA MENTIONED INCLUDING COMMAND POST AND SIMILAR EXERCISES (CPX) WAS AS FOLLOWS:

TOTAL NATO OF WHICH CPX TOTAL WP OF WHICH CPX

1973	70	30	101	74
1974	85	41	130	99
1975	82	35	133	99

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1976	70	27	135	83
TOTAL: 307 133 500 355				

C. THE FIGURES SHOW THAT, IN THE AREA MENTIONED ABOVE, THE WP CARRIED OUT APPROXIMATELY 60 PERCENT MORE CPXS AND COMBAT EXERCISES THAN NATO. WHILE, HOWEVER, ON THE SIDE OF THE WP, 70 PERCENT OF THE EXERCISE ACTIVITY IS ACCOUNTED FOR BY CPXS, THIS SHARE ONLY AMOUNTED TO 40 PERCENT ON THE PART OF NATO. A COMPARISON BETWEEN THE FIGURES FOR COMBAT EXERCISES SHOWS THAT

- NATO CONDUCTED ABOUT 60 PERCENT MORE MANEUVRES INVOLVING FEWER THAN 10,000 MEN;
- THE WP CONDUCTED ABOUT TWO AND A HALF TIMES AS MANY MANOEUVRES INVOLVING BETWEEN 10,000 AND 25,000 MEN;
- NATO CARRIED OUT FOUR TIMES AS MANY MANOEUVRES (SUBJECT TO NOTIFICATION IN ACCORDANCE WITH CSCE) IN WHICH MORE THAN 25,000 MEN PARTICIPATED. END TEXT.

12. DUTCH REP NOTED THAT GERMAN FIGURES DID NOT COVER ALL ALLIED AND WP MANEUVERS IN AREAS SUBJECT TO NOTIFICATION. THE IMS REP RESPONDED THAT, THOUGH IT MIGHT BE DIFFICULT TO PROVIDE COMPREHENSIVE AND CURRENT FIGURES WHICH WOULD SHOW TOTAL ALLIED AND WP COUNTRY MANEUVER ACTIVITY, THE IMS WOULD TRY TO GIVE SUCH FIGURES. CHAIRMAN SAID THAT SUCH A LISTING WOULD BE A USEFUL REFERENCE DOCUMENT.

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13. FUTURE MEETINGS. POLADS AGREED THAT THEIR NEXT MEETINGS ON CBMS WOULD TAKE PLACE ON MARCH 3 AND 17. INTERNATIONAL STAFF WILL, AT AN EARLY DATE, CIRCULATE DRAFT PAPER ON CBMS WHICH, AFTER REVIEW IN POLADS, COULD BE CONSIDERED AT CSCE EXPERTS MEETING MARCH 22-24 WITH CONFIDENTIAL

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THE AIM OF PUTTING IT INTO FINAL FORM BY MID-APRIL, I.E., PRIOR TO APRIL 18-19 MEETING OF EC-NINE FOREIGN MINISTERS.

14. OTHER ITEMS. PER STATE 009626 (NOTAL), WE INFORMED POLADS THAT WE WELCOME FRG PLAN TO NOTIFY 10,000 TROOP MANEUVER SCHEDULED FOR MAY. IN ADDITION, WE DREW ON STATE 023437 (NOTAL) TO BRIEF ALLIES ON US PLANS FOR MILITARY EXCHANGES WITH THE USSR. WE HAVE ALSO CIRCULATED INR ANALYSIS OF SOVIET CBM POLICY PER STATE 030029 AND BRIEFED ALLIES ON SWEDISH MANEUVER (STATE 029639 AND 026376 (NOTAL)).

15. COMMENT AND RECOMMENDATION. IT WAS APPARENT FROM FEBRUARY 10 MEETING THAT THERE IS GROWING ALLIED DESIRE TO MOVE FORWARD ON CBMS PLANNING. MOREOVER, ALLIES WISH TO HAVE SUCH PLANNING MESH WITH OVERALL PREPARATIONS FOR BELGRADE. AT THE SAME TIME, HOWEVER, FEBRUARY 10 MEETING AND OUR CORRIDOR CONVERSATIONS INDICATE THAT ALLIES FEEL HANDICAPPED IN CBM PLANNING BY ABSENCE OF SUBSTANTIVE INPUT FROM THE US. ACCORDINGLY, WE BELIEVE THAT EARLY US CONTRIBUTIONS OF ANALYSES ON SPECIFIC CBM PROPOSALS WOULD BE WELCOME HERE AND WOULD OFFER AN OPPORTUNITY TO SHAPE ALLIED PREPARATIONS FOR BELGRADE.

16. ACTION REQUEST: GUIDANCE IN TIME FOR MARCH 3 MEETING ON RECOMMENDATION IN PARA 15 AND ON CHAIRMAN'S SUGGESTION IN PARA 10. STRAUSZ-HUPE

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